-- SEC-3: make the audit log genuinely append-only. -- -- The application must be able to INSERT into audit_log and SELECT from it, and -- nothing else. Enforcing this at the database role level means that even an -- application bug — or an attacker with the application's credentials — cannot -- rewrite history. -- -- Run this ONCE after the first migration, as a superuser: -- psql -U postgres -d pharma -f scripts/harden_audit.sql -- -- Assumes the application connects as the role `pharma_app`. Create that role -- separately from the migration role: migrations need DDL rights, the running -- application does not. -- 1. The application role (create it if it does not exist). DO $$ BEGIN IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'pharma_app') THEN CREATE ROLE pharma_app LOGIN PASSWORD 'change-me-before-production'; END IF; END $$; -- 2. Normal rights on every other table. GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO pharma_app; GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO pharma_app; GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public TO pharma_app; -- 3. audit_log is the exception: insert and read only. REVOKE UPDATE, DELETE, TRUNCATE ON audit_log FROM pharma_app; -- 4. Same policy for tables created by future migrations. ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES TO pharma_app; -- 5. Belt and braces: a trigger, so the rule survives a mis-granted privilege. CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION audit_log_is_append_only() RETURNS trigger AS $$ BEGIN RAISE EXCEPTION 'audit_log is append-only: % is not permitted', TG_OP; END; $$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_audit_log_append_only ON audit_log; CREATE TRIGGER trg_audit_log_append_only BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON audit_log FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION audit_log_is_append_only();